This article asks how domestic elites contest and localise global norms in contentious post-war contexts. Engaging with critical norm research, it develops a 'two-step localisation' framework in order to explain how seemingly technical security governance programmes depend on active congruence making with constitutive state-society narratives -both by international practitioners and domestic elites. The first step consists of the adaptation that practitioners working in the field make in order to tune their message to local contexts, and the second step constitutes the locally driven processes of contestation through narrative construction. The article thus brings in deeply political negotiations over state-society narratives in order to unpack how local agents contest and reframe global norms. Applying the two-step localisation framework to a comparative case study of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control programmes in Kosovo and Cambodia, the article illustrates how the relationship between arms and state-society narratives is key to understanding the outcome of security governance processes.
Introduction
While the hubris of the liberal peacebuilding era is waning, if it is not but over, the practice of exporting 'ideal standards' through security assistance is still the business of international actors. One such practice of socialising post-war societies in global norms and standards is Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control, designed to transfer international 'best practice' for weapons collection, destruction, management and regulation. Having invested in the practice, and in developing international standards, we may expect international 'norm entrepreneurs' to continue pursuing SALW control at the end of armed conflict, despite its varying success rate to date. While evaluations of small arms control abound, few have treated it as a norm diffusion process. In order to understand the way the global enters into local contexts, this paper analyses the constitutive processes at play when SALW standards are promoted, contested, localised, and renegotiated in two key cases of postwar civilian disarmament campaigns.
Research has by now moved beyond a focus on how international standards and norms are accepted or rejected, and gone on to emphasise their intersubjective meaning in historically specific local contexts (Wiener 2004 (Wiener , 2007 (Wiener , 2014 Acharya 2004 Acharya , 2009 ). This article contributes to the literature on how international norms -contested by definition -find local meaning in post-war transition contexts, following recent debates (Zimmermann 2016; Tholens and Gross 2015) . It does so by critically advancing Acharya's framework of norm localisation (2004, 2009) , and explores the way local actors give meaning to international norms in such tense political transformation periods as after armed conflict. The article proposes a framework of 'two-step localisation' to analyse such processes: the first step constitutes the adaptation strategies that international practitioners make in order to tune their message to a local context, and the second step uncovers the locally driven process of giving meaning to international norms through endogenous, but contestatory, state-society narratives. Bringing in negotiations over narratives permits analyses that go beyond the realm of formal institutions, and probe what localisation and 'dynamic matchmaking' mean in informal, fluid and frictional post-war contexts. It also means challenging perceptions of disarmament as being 4 concern of central security institutions, not by individuals or extended families, and security institutions as legitimate representatives accountable to their community. Constructing such a collective social order is not a new or 'fragile state' phenomenon: 'The British working class was armed and militarised to facilitate collective disciplining when it suited the national purpose, and they were disarmed and demilitarised later for precisely the same reasons,' notes Squires (2000: 34) .
Henceforth, contemporary SALW control, created to enable re-socialisation processes and adjustment of mind sets and behaviour (Colletta and Muggah 2009: 10-15) , is certainly more than the technicality of removing weapons of war from societies undergoing transitions to peace. It is fundamentally about establishing a new, collective social order where the state is vested with the legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Rather than tracing specific aspects of SALW control (its very technical nature has already produced plenty of evaluations and research), this article casts the net wide and focuses on the overall configuration of state-society relations that form part of an endogenous security culture. This makes for broad contextual analyses of key post-war narratives governing state-society relations, rather than micro-evaluations of specific SALW standards.
The article proposes a critical norm approach for this purpose, and applies the adapted norm localisation framework to two post-conflict SALW control programmes: the EU-ASAC project in Cambodia (2000 Cambodia ( -2005 , and the UNDP-ISAC/KOSSAC projects in Kosovo (2002 Kosovo ( -2014 . The two programmes took place roughly during the same time period; they consisted of roughly similar types of international actors; and they were completed with similar-sized budgets. Their project outcomes are, however, quite different: the Cambodian project collected large amounts of civilian-held weapons, set them ablaze in publically sanctioned 'flames of peace' ceremonies, and effectively eradicated the problem of gun crime among the public. The Kosovo project, instead, was unable to collect even a few hundred weapons, found unfertile ground among local stakeholders to support antigun campaigns, and struggled to endow a new Arms Law with legitimacy -although later iterations aimed at embedding the programme within post-independence Kosovo institutions, achieved some success with less ambitious targets. There are certainly a number of explanations as to why these two 5 outcomes were so different: there might be reasons to believe that Kosovars did not want to give up their weapons due to the unsettled conflict with Serbia. Yet, neither was Cambodia a secure place in the early 2000s, where the Khmer Rouge had been active up until the late 1990s. In fact, prominent observers in early 2000s were pessimistic about the future stability of Cambodia after 30 odd years at war. Moreover, SALW control outcomes might be related to the length of the preceding war:
Cambodians might have been tired of war and conflict after nearly three decades of it, while Kosovars were perhaps still keen to ensure their battle readiness. In addition, tradition -e.g. hunting practices, or the so-called 'gun cultures' -might influence the outcome of SALW control projects. There are almost certainly numerous inter-related reasons why some disarmament programmes succeed, while other fail.
This article shows how state-society narratives contributed to shaping the way these outcomes came about, in conjuncture with other context-specific factors. The comparative research design is used as a tool to expose the crucial role of narratives in making sense of all the other factors influencing post-war security governance. The research was conducted through in situ interviews between 2008 and 2012 with SALW control stakeholders. In the absence of ethnographic research, the empirical case studies also rely on secondary data analysis from sociology, anthropology and historiography. The research puts forward an interpretivist thesis that the story of disarmament matters as much as the weapons themselves.
The paper proceeds by first reflecting on the nexus between norms and post-war security governance, before presenting the adapted norm localisation framework, linking a critical norm approach to parallel debates in the field of peacebuilding studies. It then details how the proposed framework of analysis enables us to uncover the processes shaping the 'failed' and the 'successful' Small Arms Control programmes in Kosovo and Cambodia, respectively.
Security governance, SALW control and norm diffusion 6
Research in the field of post-war peacebuilding has been concerned with international attempts to socialise and engineer target states and domestic societies (Gheciu 2005a; Ignatieff 2003) . It has been noted that the neoliberal peacebuilding enterprise deeply resembles the imperial practices of socialising and co-opting elites (Chandler 2006; Darby 2009) , and that the use of local ownership models and capacity building techniques are essentially aimed at teaching a selected segment of the population the correct 'formula' of liberal democratic systems (Gheciu 2005b) . Lately, mixed systems of liberal and illiberal norms are observed to exist (MacGinty 2010; Jarstad and Belloni 2012) , and some see 'friction' as a distinct condition between the 'global' and the 'local' in post-war reconstruction processes (Björkdahl and Höglund 2014; Millar et al. 2013) .
What peacebuilding studies have shown us is that the struggle to (re)assemble a community set of rules and values in the aftermath of war is crucial: legitimacy between governors and the governed is key to sustainable peace, and to effective governance. States can rule by coercion alone, but there are significant gains in ruling by consent. Legitimacy enables the state to assume authority over society, which relinquishes some degree of autonomy in return for protection and collective goods.
Such a contractual view of the state focuses on the functional aspects of relations between the state and society. However, one way of fixing the analysis in cases where formal institutions act as sites of contestation rather than as governing bodies, is to work with ideational properties of specific statesociety relations. Ideational properties are those configurations of norms, values and ideology from which the state elicits legitimacy from society, and which guide the relationship between the two. This is akin to constructing what Joel Migdal has called 'symbolic configurations' of rewards and sanctions, ordered and packaged in a 'moral economy' by those seeking social control (Migdal 1988: 26) . Migdal argues further that social control by the state is indicated first by compliance to its demands; second by participation in state-authorised institutions; and third by legitimation of the 'state's rules of the game', which 'indicates people's approval of the state's desired social order through their acceptance of the state's myths ' (ibid.: 27) . By focusing on the construction of these 'state myths', this article argues that it is possible to link state-society narratives with the success or failure of SALW control.
This speaks to the literature on the social construction of weapons (cf. Perrin 1997; Eyre and Suchman 1996) , which demonstrates how even this core aspect of realist thought must yield to nonrationalist analyses. Weapons lie at the heart of crafting legitimacy for the state's monopoly on the use of force, and synergy between state policy and societal mechanisms for controlling weapons is crucial for effective firearms control (Ashkenazi 2010: 234) . Therefore, when we discuss very material dimensions of power -firearms -we cannot escape analyses of how elites construct state myths aimed at fostering legitimacy for their rule in the aftermath of war (cf. also Widmaier 2007) .
Contrary to other norms often studied under the banner of 'conventional' constructivism, the set of norms called SALW norms in this article is highly contested by key international actors, and lacks a clearly delineated scope. SALW norms still lack a critical mass making it 'cascade', and are a far cry from internalisation (Garcia 2006; Grillot 2011 (Capie 2008) . The constantly negotiated content of SALW norms can be said to allow 8 for analyses that take seriously a definition of norms as fundamentally contested, while centring the foci on those non-linear and global-local linkages that undergird post-war struggles.
Adapting norm localisation to post-war security governance
The literature on global norms has moved from a focus on the purely international level to a focus on what happens when international norms meet local contexts, and especially how contestation is a key process in giving meaning to external norms (see the other contributions to this Forum). Acharya (2004, 2009) argues that norm localisation is particularly apt to capture the process of a 'dynamic matchmaking' between an external idea and the local 'cognitive prior'. This resonates with studies that consider agency as decisive in norm diffusion processes (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998) , and where local salience is taken seriously Davis 2000, 2005) . Yet, while the localisation framework shifts the focus of analysis to local agency explicitly, and goes beyond static models of a global-local 'match', or static 'salience', it does not pose an epistemological challenge to 'conventional' constructivism, with its neo-positivist perspective where norms constitute a form of independent variable that causes an effect. Acharya treats localisation explicitly as the outcome of diffusion, akin to such an 'effect'. While there is merit in the localisation framework, it could be enhanced by uncovering what the 'dynamic matchmaking' implies beyond formal institutional adjustments. Focusing on congruence making instead connects with conceptualisation of norms as processes, rather than as 'things' (Krook and True 2012) . Non-rationalistic approaches emphasise that ideas are symbolic and representational, and thereby social and intersubjective, rather than a collection of individual beliefs, and that ideas are themselves forms of power through their capacities to produce representations (Laffey and Weldes 1997: 210) . Treating norms as process rather than 'things' or a 'cause' allows a better and deeper understanding of the constant reconstitution of norms. This is consistent with critical norm research, where contestation describes a process of constituting meaning through interactions, and which demonstrates that norms are constantly negotiated and acquire divergent meanings depending on the context in which they are used (Wiener 2004 In order to take the localization framework to a more critical engagement with 'dynamic matchmaking', it is purposeful to define this process as creating 'state myths' through narrative construction. Narrative construction as a concept originates from cognitive psychology, for which it has been used to explain how people construct the nature of their reality (Bruner 1991) . Similarly, for the purpose of studying struggles over interpretation in post-war contexts, narrative construction takes the form of a series of negotiations over the content of key concepts guiding state-society relations:
authority, legitimacy, national identity, and the persona of the state itself. Narrative construction, in this case, signifies the process in which agents promote historically conditioned conceptualisations of (national) identity, with the intention of legitimising a specific view of state-society relations.
Security models, in the case of post-war security governance, act as institutions, which narrative construction processes compete to influence. The contest over dominant narratives is an internationaldomestic struggle, as well as a struggle between different sets of domestic actors that seek to provide the winning 'symbolic configurations', ordered and packaged in a 'moral economy', in Migdal's words. Referring back to the SALW control context, we may therefore identify three sets of agents with interest in promoting specific narratives concerning the type of 'security culture' of a given country: international actors, primarily the SALW control implementing organisation, but potentially also other competing international actors; domestic elites, such as political party leaders emerging out of war time configurations, local mayors, economic elites, and military actors; and the public, functioning as reservoirs of values, norms and beliefs with which competing elite narratives must engage. Negotiations over master narratives bounce back and forth between these three agential levels, and interact in what is described below as two-step localisation. The outcome of SALW control, ultimately, depends on the extent to which these narratives feed into intersubjective ideas consistent with a collective security culture, in which the state is seen as the legitimate defender of individual, societal and national security. Constructing the frames of interpretation and systems of representation is more than an intuitive exercise in understanding the social world. It is fundamentally an exercise in power over knowledge. Power in the process of narrative construction means the ability to provide strategies of interpretation that legitimises certain systems of representation and specific types of action. For example, successfully constructing narratives of a society that is meant to take order from its rulers, complete with historical references and national mottoes, may enable rulers to act with impunity, but also to facilitate civilian disarmament, as will be made clear in the case study of Cambodia below.
Two-step localisation
We may distinguish between two sets of legitimation strategies over the winning 'state myths': first, international actors are forced to make adaptations based on conditions they encounter in the specific post-war environment, and second, local actors contest and give their own meaning and interpretation of global norms promoted by international agents. As we will see in the cases of Cambodia and Kosovo, international adaptation and domestic reinterpretation are pragmatic processes of 'dynamic matchmaking' -even as the original meaning of the international norm might get lost in the process.
The first step of the revised localisation framework takes the form of practitioner-driven strategies aimed at creating synergy between the external ideas underpinning specific security governance and local realities. What is intended by practitioner is staff of international organisations who work in the field offices of their respective organisations, and who are responsible for the implementation of specific programs. We can identify at least three elements of such a localisation strategy in post-war settings: local ownership, whereby domestic institutions are included in the project planning and/or implementation; engaging with the local political culture, thus actively seeking legitimacy by manoeuvring domestic political actors and discourses; and adaptation, i.e.
those adjustments, alterations, and selective process of making the external model of SALW control 'work' within the political, cultural, and social context. We can recognise adaptation where the original design of the disarmament project is altered during the course of the implementation phase.
Empirically we often observe that field-based practitioners have significant scope for adapting SALW control norms, but that it takes political, cultural and social skills to achieve an acceptable balance between international expectations and local politics. This strategy consists of constructing narratives that hedge SALW norms of collective security with often prevalent post-war discourses of victors, victories and domination. While agreeing that many peacebuilding missions are out of touch with local politics, effectively viewing its politics as 'noise' that 'distorts' the 'prescribed' policy path, it is also empirically pertinent to observe how practitioners working in the field are keenly aware that their success is dependent on tailor-made solutions suitable to the conditions on the ground.
Moreover, practitioners often seek to juggle expectations from the international organisation with the limits and potentialities defining the local context in which they operate, rendering their role as 'dynamic matchmakers' critical.
The second step is the process in which domestic elites promote historically conditioned conceptualisations of society, the state and their inter-relationship, with the intention of convincing the public of a specific representation of state-society relations. 'State myths', which may afford new political elites the privilege of ruling by consent, are at stake. In order to determine how state-society narratives come about, it is necessary to scrutinise two elements of dominant discourses. First, it matters how the 'authentic' peoples of the land are portrayed. Considering that 'the nation' is very much in the making, making claims about the characteristics attributed to the real, or 'authentic', citizen is key to understand how society is framed. Constitutive features of the nation shape the ideational properties of state-society relations, and these properties subsequently influence the outcome of security governance programmes. As will be demonstrated in the empirical cases below, for SALW control purposes, we may discern diverging narratives of the nation; a 'militant and rebellious' type and a 'peaceful and compliant' one. In the 'militant and rebellious' type, local elites valorise the armed struggle with the intention to exclude other actors competing over political legitimacy, and cement coherence among the national group. By feeding the public with heroes, folkloristic symbolism, and exclusionary national identity politics, they ensure their own political survival. In the second type, society is characterised in 'peaceful and compliant' terms. Elites provide narratives based on peaceful and compliant society because they believe they will lead to their own long-term political survival, and because they are confident that no significant alternative narratives exist to which the public can turn.
The second set of narratives to explore in the second step is that which defines the persona of the state, meaning the identity, character and attributes of the polity. Is it egalitarian vis-à-vis the nation, or does it encompass absolute power both internally and externally? The use of the term persona indicates the constructed nature of the state in the consciousness of society. Vis-à-vis society, it is crucial to outline convincingly a narrative that reinforces the constitutive dimensions of the nation. Enacting the state persona is a key role for national elites. But the persona of the state is also linked to wider international configurations, especially to the immediate geopolitical context. There is thus a dual exercise of constituting the state by framing it in terms consistent with the domestic state-society framework, as well as with the regional and international order.
The next section will demonstrate how these processes work in practice. Through a thick description of two key SALW control cases, it shows how state myth-making created such divergent interpretations of weapons in society in a Cambodian and a Kosovar context. phases of the KOSSAC project was better than that of its predecessor, although this might have been due to more realistic targets rather than tangible impact and implementation, which still seemed to be lacking (UNDP 2010).
Step 1: international adaptation of SALW control narratives
As identified in the framework of 'two-step localisation' above, the first step in the process of introducing new norms of collective security to post-conflict societies is through field-based international practitioners' strategies. We can scrutinise their strategies systematically through three dimensions: involvement by domestic actors ('local ownership'), engagement with relevant political culture, and tuning the message of SALW Control through context-specific adaptations.
First, the UNDP's main challenge regarding local ownership rested with the authoritarian role of international peacekeepers in Kosovo from 1999 and until today: NATO's KFOR troops were highly regarded and seen as the most trusted international institution within Kosovo, yet their role as guardians of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in the province until 2008 was highly problematic for the purpose of promoting disarmament. Discontent with UNMIK and its neo-colonial legacy in
Kosovo created a lack of legitimacy and precisely ownership over politico-security processes.
Kosovo was to be a disarmed, de-militarised, and to some extent servile entity, protected by, but also existing at the mercy of, its international protectors. This was linked to the 'status neutral' position adopted by international actors in Kosovo until 2008, which required international actors to avoid partisan politics which could influence the unresolved issue of Kosovo's future and independence.
Including domestic actors in SSR activities such as SALW control would therefore potentially legitimise Kosovar (as opposed to Serbian) political structures, 4 and although in later iterations of the KOSSAC project there were attempts at involving both Albanians and Serbs in the implementation of the project, the damage had been done: giving up weapons is also a part of authorising that structure to govern, and Kosovars were not willing to see the UNDP, NATO or any other foreign force as that authority. This eventually also extended to local civil society organisations. The ISAC programmes during the first half of the 2000s relied substantially on civil society groups to spearhead the message of disarmament, in the absence of credible government institutions. International support to NGOs was substantial in this period, but their ability to influence such a sensitive matter was limited: they had little leverage in shaping the programmes, and local politics was unreceptive to the voice of internationally funded civil society organisations. Local mayors proved powerful veto-players, and 15
NGOs operated largely at their mercy. 5 This rendered civil society weak as transmitters of SALW norms. They did not present credible alternative narratives to those provided by influential local politicians. As Enver X, a member of staff with an NGO in Gjilan, experienced, raising awareness of the problem of SALW in society at schools in 2006 had little effect since the local mayor did not see any interest in supporting this message among its wider constituency, i.e. the parents and families of the 'taught' school children. 6 The lack of any formal institutions after the Serbs' withdrawal from Kosovo in 1999 resulted in the territory effectively turning into an international protectorate, or 'Unmikstan', as critical commentary would have it. Security institutions were built 'from scratch', which meant that they were at the receiving end of micro-disarmament programmes, rather than executing them. The experiment in international governance failed to engage with the emerging political culture, which some of the international personnel described as 'a political landscape based upon a blueprint of clan structures'. (Malcolm 1998) , the KLA developed a rural-based and militant guerrilla movement to counter Serbian oppression. These two approaches, aiming however at the same goal of autonomy for Albanians in Kosovo, never reconciled (Judah 2000) . Subsequently, identity politics in the postwar theatre were defined by competing strategies by these two blocs, and their sub-units of Albanian political elites. Such 'clan-based' politics was not only alien to the UNDP -it was rejected and ignored in strategic planning and implementation. Insisting on a neutral policy, where local politics were seen as detrimental to the state-building project, rather than as a natural part of it, Small Arms 9 and, as such, was seen as difficult to implement. As one interviewee stated, 'The problem with the drafting of the new law was that the influence of the internationals was too big. Everyone have weapons here, for tradition, or because it is a part of our history. We learned to live in this environment, these are our habits.' 10 The lack of adaptation to Kosovo political processes, and an uncompromising approach to SALW control were detrimental to a flexible approach that would permit Kosovo-style disarmament.
Henceforth, SALW control remained an external, European, and distant idea that resonated poorly with post-war Kosovo. The UNDP was constrained by their own interpretation of their role and purpose as peacebuilders in Kosovo to establish connections with key political personalities and tap into societal-level discourses. The second step of the localisation framework explains this in more detail.
Step 2: localisation through contestatory narratives
Contrary to a reading of failed disarmament as due to the security situation or the ubiquitous 'gun culture' that supposedly was to be found in some parts of Albania/Kosovo, three specific state-society narratives are key to the constitutive dimension of 'weapons in society' in post-war Kosovo. Taken together, they yield a more complex and embedded explanation for why civilian disarmament became such a sensitive and sticky issue. 135-42). These regions recruited leadership, soldiers, and not least a set of historical analogies and structural grievances: it was in the Drenica valley that the historical hero Azen Bejta and his wife Shota Galica had fought against the first Yugoslav forces after the First World War, and it was here that the most ostracised and poorest people in Yugoslavia lived. What is more, it was in the Drenica village of Prekaz that Adem Jashari and his extended family became martyrs for the KLA in 1997.
Observers have described Prekaz as a site of memory significant for Albanian nation-building in
Kosovo (Obućina 2011) . Drenica, Llap and Dukagjini were strongholds of resistance during the 1990s war, and subsequently played important roles as points of reference for the Kosovars in the post-war history writing. However, elevating traditionalism to the national level was not a process without resistance. In the 1980s and 1990s, the urban/rural divide was an obstacle to overcome in order to close ranks in the face of an existential threat, and a weakness exploited by Serbia, who targeted the 'rebels' in the countryside but left urban centres such as Prishtina and Mitrovica largely in peace (Sugarman 2010) . The former KLA party leaders came out of these most rural areas in Step 1: international adaptation of SALW control narratives
Local ownership was a key feature of the EU-ASAC process: the project was clearly an assistance mission, and its mandate was advisory in nature. The Cambodian government voluntarily requested the assistance of an external organisation to provide expertise in the disarmament process. With the launching of the EU-ASAC programme in April 2000, few observers were optimistic about the faith of the precarious stability that had followed Hun Sen's 'coup' and the monarchy's political devaluation in 1997. Hun Sen's violent attempt to fully control the government was seen by prominent observers at the time as another event in the bloody history of Cambodia (Doyle 2001) .
The initiative to run small arms control in the country, henceforth, was premised on this voluntary invitation by the sitting political power; namely Hun Sen and the Cambodia's People Party (CPP).
The foundation of the EU project was furthermore ad hoc in nature: there was no formal agreement between the EU and the Cambodian government guiding the EU-ASAC programme. Instead, it was based on and developed through close personal relations between the international EU staff and key figures in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of National Defence (MND) (Roberts 2008 ).
In addition, the project worked directly towards communities and civil society organisationstraditional and NGOs. The ability to reach out to communities by means of mobilising Buddhist institutions was important to ensure a locally sanctioned approach to the issue. This conscious collaboration with Cambodian institutions is part of the story of how the EU-ASAC could be successful in introducing SALW control in the challenging environment of post-war Cambodia.
Acknowledging and actively engaging with Cambodian political culture proved a crucial inroad to project legitimacy. Personal relationships are of utmost importance in Cambodian social and political life. It is highly unlikely that the EU-ASAC would have been able to work as extensively as they did had it not been for a slow and gradual process by the EU-ASAC staff to win the confidence of two key influential persons in the military and the police. These two liaison persons, in turn, gave access to the top political brass, which was a sine qua non for operating in the country. As a part of the confidence-building process, intimate family-like relations were born, and the liaison generals and the EU-ASAC staff started referring to each other as 'bong' -the Khmer word for 'brother'.
14 While the relationships were instrumental at their foundations, they slowly moved towards more personal bonds, and the manifestation of the emotional-instrumental links have been recounted during author interviews. 15 The dynamic was one in which the personal became intertwined with the professional, and where the international staff learned the Cambodian way of doing business on the basis of personalised contact, discreetness and confidentiality. In turn, this enabled the EU-ASAC to work as a partner to the government, and to be given space and permission to work with fewer constraints than if they were seen as intruding, bypassing or otherwise hampering internal affairs.
Furthermore, as a former EU-ASAC staff explained, this unofficial way was considerably more efficient: permissions that would normally have taken three months to obtain through the formal bureaucratic system would take a week through these informal channels. 16 As the project progressed, and Cambodia became one of the SALW pioneers in South East Asia, the role of the EU-ASAC staff actually accelerated, as the pressure from outside on the internationally inexperienced Cambodian generals increased with respect to dealing with international negotiations or conventions: the EU-ASAC became a trusted reservoir of knowledge, and was seen as useful to enhance Cambodia's regional standing.
Moreover, the disarmament message was adapted significantly to fit the domestic context and manoeuvre instrumental-normative boundaries. First of all, the disarmament information meetings with local communities were held in local pagodas across rural Cambodia, and attended by Buddhist monks who sanctioned the message to the constituencies of believers. The slogan was: 'put down your weapons, pick up the dharma', thereby locating the message within Buddhist notions of virtue and moral ethics. 17 Another example can be seen in the adoption of a legal framework of SALW control. Developing an Arms Law is one of the ways in which SALW control is introduced in postwar societies, and it is often endowed with great expectations from international practitioners. In Cambodia, the scope and content of the Arms Law were subjected to intense negotiations. The EU-ASAC's effort to enhance the role of civil society had proven relatively successful, and it was the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR), a local NGO that worked extensively on the issue of SALW between 1999 and 2006, which was seen as the main voice in the process of negotiating the Arms Law. WGWR was the leading advocate for a strict and universal law, in which there would be a full ban on civilian weapons ownership, and the government seems to have taken many of these aspects into account in the final version. But one principle was not up for negotiation: while the government banned civilian ownership of weapons, certain high-ranking civil servants would still be permitted to own licensed firearms, which, according to the director of the WGWR at the time, was due to the fact that the person in charge of the licensing bureau within the MoI was a particularly influential person. If all civilian gun possession were illegal, his office would lose serious 'income'
(i.e. extra-legal fees). On this point, the MoI refused to budge and said 'this way or no way'. 18 In the MoI, this particularity of the Arms Law was explained from a security perspective: 'we must consider the role and responsibility and rank, and compare to the military. In the end it is for their own security'. 19 This example illustrates the prevalence of corruption practices within the Cambodian bureaucratic system. However, it also illustrates the strength of neo-patrimonial forms of governance and the fact that a powerful person in the seemingly insignificant licensing office exerted his personal influence so as to affect the outcome of a national legal document. Furthermore, it illustrates what will be described in the next section as the state-society narrative of 'natural authority': the idea that high-ranking civil servants should own weapons fits well with the Cambodian state-society narrative attached to it. The final Arms Law is, therefore, an example of norm adaptation: while deeply influenced by an idea of controlling weapons in society consistent with SALW control standards, it also contains 'Cambodian' elements that strengthen the existing institutions within the bureaucracy, and is aligned with the normative framework that guides power relations in society.
Explaining the outcome of the EU-ASAC through narratives of representation begs an analysis that centres on the normative properties of the Khmer nation that emerged after the dust of war had settled.
The state-society model that was narrated during the EU-ASAC years, and which has been further consolidated thereafter, pinned the Khmer society as the bottom part of a hierarchical system structured by absolutism, natural authority, and notions of a peaceful agrarian society, as will be and by framing the role of society as victims of external aggression, and as benevolent and compliant, the politico-economic elites around the CPP successfully evoked emotive concepts linked to past grandeur and enduring patrimonial social representations. This conception of society enabled, but also limited, the EU-ASAC: they were able to inform civilians that the state was the new legitimate bearer of force by tapping into these discourses already propagated by the government. However, they also reinforced the existing power structures, and were able to influence weapons practices on terms only consistent with a semi-authoritarian political model. SALW control standards therefore got a thick paint of absolutism and elitism in Cambodia. An example of this is the way the EU-ASAC provided training in the Arms Law to law enforcement officers, and handed out thousands of copies of the law. But, as is often observed in Cambodia, powerful people can act with impunity (Kimchoeun et al. 2007) . A member of a local organisation of lawyers that assisted in the drafting of the 2005 Arms Law explained in an interview that the main problem of weapons misuse is related to those that own weapons legally, notably high ranking officials, and -illegally but arguably not illegitimately -their children, as well as bodyguards of the Members of Parliament or high ranking officials. 20 These persons, however, constitute the political and economic elite in Cambodia, and are considered untouchable by law -as one informant sums up:
'in Cambodia, only the poor are afraid of the law'.
21
A second key narrative that enveloped the EU-ASAC was that of natural authority (and the lack of it), and its framing as an indisputable condition that is not plausibly subject to change in this life. The philosophical genealogy of this conceptualisation of authority can be traced to two main religious principles: the idea of 'merit' in Buddhism, and 'hierarchy' or 'Brahmanism' in Hinduism.
Buddhism has dominated Cambodian religious life from the 13 th century onward, and social and societal relations are substantially guided by Buddhist social doctrine. A key concept here is 'merit', which in Buddhist philosophy translates into accumulating good deeds, to improve one's karma -the sum of one's good and bad doings in this life and the previous. A good karma is needed to ensure better life conditions in the next life, and eventually this cycle will lead to nirvana, in which one is elevated to eternal life and transgresses the cycle of reincarnation. Belief in karma as the sole earthly merit impacts social relations in that it legitimises the relative power imbalance between members of a community, as it is perceived as 'natural': people with more wealth or a higher social ranking are believed to enjoy these circumstances due to good karma stemming from previous lives. Along the same logic, the poor or people of low social standing perceive of their situation as 'given'; the only hope for improvement is to be found in accumulating a better karma through earthly merits or good deeds for the next life. Upward social mobility, as it were, does not exist as a perceived attainable concept in the traditional Khmer society. As observed by others, preaching this philosophy as meaning accepting one's lot in life serves the wishes of the authorities well (Marston 2009: 246) .
However, blending with this idea that authority or power (material or social) is a predestined given, and that one shall not challenge inequality because it is tied to the eternal cycle of karma, is also the Hindu-inspired belief in social hierarchy, or Brahmanism. Hinduism as a source of social norms stems from the time of Indianisation predating the Angkorian period, but was substantially adapted to Khmer conditions (Chandler 2008) . Hence, a social stratification system was to some extent accepted, while not in the rigid Indian form of a caste system. Hindu beliefs in principles of hierarchy have, however, generated tendencies towards personalisation of power in the form of supreme leaders, and the result is a fairly stable system of patrimonial inter-personal relations, in which those in power are seen to naturally possess power, while people on other social levels have been born to take orders (Kimchoeun et al. 2007: 34) . This narrative is critical to understanding parts of the Cambodian postwar developments, including aspects of the micro-disarmament process. Specifically, this natural hierarchy can be witnessed in the state-society model envisaged by Cambodian elites, for whom 'a harmonious relationship between a centralized and hierarchical government apparatus, and
Cambodian citizens, sharing a mutual respect and rightful conduct, is viewed as the appropriate goal' (Hughes 1998: 306) . This narrative aided the EU-ASAC, which, with the help of the CPP and central institutions as well as locally based Buddhist institutions, could tap into reverence for authority to further its message: the Khmer society was framed in the post-war state-society narratives as 'born to take orders', and as fundamentally a peaceful farming society that ought to return to these roots after decades of war and uprooting. Research has shown that the government saw an opportunity to use weapons collection as a means to strengthen the position of the CPP, the ruling party, and that disarmament meant less potential for armed resistance to government policy (Zwijnenburg 2007: 29) .
Subsequently, a small and powerful set of elites forms a politico-military network of individuals that extracts individual wealth through their control of state institutions (Roberts 2009; Richmond and 28 Franks 2007; Brinkley 2011; Global Witness 2009) . While the EU-ASAC did seek to introduce accountability of the military and the police in rural Cambodia, its success must ultimately be seen as a function of the overall CPP attempt to disarm (militarily and politically) society and assume the 'natural' position of absorbing all political and economic means of influence.
Conclusion: two-step norm localisation in international SALW control
Interpretation of SALW control, and the role of weapons in society more broadly, does matter. In fact, it is essential to any successful disarmament campaign, because it its deeply linked to constitutive ideas of the nation emerging out of the ashes of war. Narratives of authority, nationhood, and the state persona create systems of representation that match claims by certain political agents.
Competitions over dominant narratives are fierce and exclusionary: emerging political elites will go to great length to ensure that 'their' selected set of narratives constitutes the nation's identity marker.
Hence, as this article has demonstrated, analysing the interaction between emerging and contestatory narratives of state-society relations and international efforts to introduce SALW control programmes in a given country makes it apparent how crucial interpretation of disarmament is. This goes much beyond a simple focus on gun cultures: it involves a view to the construction of those crucial symbolic configurations that make up societies and structure the relationship between nations and states. For the purpose of SALW control, it has proven important to understand which political actors have vested interest in promoting certain interpretations of history, religion, authority, coreperiphery relations, and national belonging. Elites emerging out of armed conflict have one primary goal: to stick identification markers commensurate with their goals and interest onto the state. This, as the title indicates, amounts to an effort aimed at 'winning the post-war'. These legitimisation strategies, in turn, shape the space available to international practitioners working on SALW control programmes, whose capacity to adapt and engage with local political conditions and political actors is of essence when it comes to introducing localised 'global SALW standards' to post-war societies.
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The findings from this article beg the question of how purposeful norm diffusion approaches are to explore the modalities and effects of global-local linkages. It is apparent that conventional constructivist approaches do not quite capture how norms move in non-linear ways in contexts of hybrid political order. A critical norm approach is better apt to frame the interpretative aspect of norms, and give importance to the constitution of norms through enactment. This article has contributed to the latter strand of norm research by honing in on how narratives shape the interpretation of global norms, and act as transmission belts to political legitimacy. What this article has also exposed, however, is how tracing norms and their effects is an increasingly challenging undertaking: global-local linkages are multidirectional, fluid and un-scripted, and such a naturalised part of political practices that it is increasingly difficult to establish how the global 'enters into' the local. Narrative analyses, in the way interrogated in this article, serve this purpose. Narratives do not start or end with the 'global' norm, but rather cast the net in concentric circles, forming overlapping areas of densely woven social fabric, without which even such things as weapons -the materiality of 
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